Introduction
This is a book about how American appellate courts dealt with the struggle for lesbian and gay civil rights during the last two decades of the twentieth century. The volume also uses that conflict as a lens to scrutinize judicial behavior beyond the scope of homosexual rights. The research is grounded on an exhaustive database of court cases about gay rights and of the personal attributes of the judges who decided them, as well as the ideological, institutional, and legal environments in which the decisions were situated. The empirical findings are striking, and I summarize some notable ones at the start.
First, a bench that is diverse with regard to age, gender, race, and religion is important to securing lesbian and gay rights. Judges who are female, African American, Latino, Jewish, or young (i.e., in their thirties or forties) are more likely than those who are male, white, Protestant, or older to recognize sexual minority rights and to treat lesbians and gay men as equal citizens whose distinctive interests and concerns merit judicial recognition. More generally, diversifying the bench to include groups that experience invidious discrimination creates sensitivity to the legal claims of other such communities. Heterogeneity among judges substantially helps to secure rights, and not just for the groups immediately represented. Moreover, this finding presumptively applies to all public officeholders.
The flip side of the coin is that other categories of jurists -for example, Roman Catholics and those with prior career experience in elective public office -have been far less hospitable to the civil rights of homosexuals.
Second, the law -both judge-made and legislatively enacted -also matters. If legal precedents supporting gay rights are won, that case law makes it significantly more likely that later tribunals, even those staffed with antigay jurists, will uphold those rights. Further, courts in jurisdictions with consensual sodomy statutes are less prone to back lesbians and gay men, while those where legislatures have adopted gay civil rights laws are more likely to embrace gay rights across the board. Thus, homosexual activists and their supporters should strive for further decriminalization of consensual sodomy in the nation, even though the offense is virtually unenforced. At the same time, successful political action for legislative passage of gay civil rights statutes will likely reverberate in the judicial arena.
Third, unlike the experience of the civil rights movement, the federal judiciary is not the most promising battle ground for the gay rights struggle. After more than three decades in which Republican presidents predominately selected federal judges, there are now numerous state courts more receptive to the legal claims of lesbians and gay men than the federal bench as a whole. Those groups pursuing litigative strategies to secure rights are best advised to work at the state level, even though participation by gay interest groups as counsel or amicus curiae has enhanced the likelihood of victory in federal tribunals.
Finally, the success of homosexuals in appellate courts generally has improved over time, especially with regard to gay family issues. In particular, judges have been increasingly more supportive of parental rights for gay people. Time appears to be on their side.
The Context of the Study
Lesbian and gay rights have received substantial attention in legal and political science research. For example, Koppelman (2000) reports that a "February 2000 search of articles listed under 'sexual orientation discrimination' in the Index of Legal Periodicals found 96 articles written on the subject from 1989 to 1994. From 1995 to the date of the search, there were 540 articles." In addition, many notable books have appeared, 1 contributing to a rich understanding of the place of lesbians and gay men in American law and politics.
The scholarship on gays and the law, however, has been overwhelmingly normative or qualitative, with very few systematically statistical or otherwise quantitative investigations of legal issues relevant to gay people.
2 This dearth of quantitative empirical inquiry -as opposed to qualitative empirical research (Epstein and King 2002) -into the civil rights of homosexuals is in stark contrast to the wealth of statistical information on lesbian and gay politics.
3
The comparative lack of quantitative empirical legal scholarship is not surprising, because such investigation often dismays legal academics. As Friedman (1986: 774) observes, empirical research is hard work, and lots of it; it is also nonlibrary research, and many law teachers are afraid of it; it calls for skills that most law teachers do not have; if it is at all elaborate, it is team research, and law teachers are not used to this kind of effort; often it requires hustling grant money from foundations or government agencies, and law teachers simply do not know how to do that. . . . Prestige is a factor too. Law schools . . . tend to exalt "theory" over applied research. Empirical research has an applied air to it, compared to "legal theory." The academic disciplines of law and political science were once closely entwined under the rubric of the study of government. At the start of the twentieth century, to study government was to study law. . . . But as the century developed, and particularly after mid-century, the distance between the two disciplines grew. Today, legal academics and political scientists inhabit different worlds with 2 The books by law professors (Cain, Eskridge, Halley, Koppelman, Richards, and Strasser) in note 1 have no consequential quantitative components; nor do most gay rights articles in law reviews and journals. Indeed, the only legal scholarship on lesbians and gay men informed by noteworthy data is Posner (1992) and Halley (1993) . Examining countries tolerating homosexuality far more than the United States, Posner concludes there is no empirical evidence that elevating the social and legal status of gay people will increase their numbers. Halley reviews primary sources on the Georgia sodomy statute upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) and discovers that the Supreme Court's historical interpretation of the law is mistaken. 3 Books such as Button et al. (1997) , Bailey (1999 ), Gerstmann (1999 , Riggle and Tadlock (1999b) , Rimmerman et al. (2000) , and Badgett (2001), as well as articles such as Sherrill (1993, 1996) , Haeberle (1996 ), Haider-Markel and Meier (1996 ), Wald, Button, and Rienzo (1996 ), and Gamble (1997 , are substantially empirical. 4 For further explication of the paucity of empirical legal scholarship, see Schuck (1989) , Nard (1995 ), Schlegel (1995 , and Heise (1999).
little in common. If they communicate at all, they can barely hear each other; they stand on opposite sides of a great divide, and they are looking in opposite directions.
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Most law professors and other legal academics endorse variations of legal formalism (Cross 1997: 255-63; Gillman 2001: 466) . Termed the "legal model" by political scientists, this scholarly approach to understanding judicial decision making "postulates that decisions are based on the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the framers, precedent, and a balancing of societal interests" (Segal and Spaeth 1993: 32) . Case characteristics, such as whether police in search-and-seizure appeals have prior justification or intrude on the home or business (Segal 1984 (Segal , 1986 , have a direct impact on court decisions, and judges faithfully observe the doctrine of stare decisis (Segal and Spaeth 1993: 44-49) .
In contrast, many political scientists recommend the "attitudinal model," which "holds that [courts] decide disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the [judges]" (Segal and Spaeth 1993: 65) . Individuals' values guide judicial votes to achieve policy preferences. For example, using seven personal attributes, Tate (1981) accounted for 70 to 90 percent of the variance in Supreme Court justices' voting in nonunanimous decisions concerning civil rights and liberties as well as economics.
Advocates of these models typically brook no compromise and take no prisoners. For example, Segal and Spaeth are inflexible attitudinalists:
We believe we have sensitively analyzed the relevant internal and external nonattitudinal factors. Their impact on the decisions appears to be minimal. The eminently testable role of judicial activism and restraint effectively masks behavior; it doesn't explain it. . . . Such highly plausible external influences -such as the Solicitor General, Congress, public opinion, and interest groups -come up empty 5 Graber (2002: 315) supplies some particulars:
None of the fifty most cited law reviews as of 1985 [citation omitted] engage at any length with a work written by any political scientist who studied or studies public law. Thirty of those works do not cite any work by a political scientist on courts. . . . The citation patterns in those works that cite political science scholarship on courts is best described as random. Even when articles are classified by subject matter, there does not appear to be any political scientist or work on courts that the legal community from 1947 until 1985 felt obliged to read or cite.
With Critics of rigid devotion to monolithic judicial behavior models argue that scholars such as Segal and Spaeth have toppled only a straw person, because no fully articulated legal model exists to warrant meaningful fidelity (Canon 1993; Caldeira 1994; Rosenberg 1994; Smith 1994; Brisbin 1996) . Caldeira This book bridges these fields of scholarly inquiry through an accessible and coherent quantitative empirical study of how state and federal appellate courts dealt with lesbian and gay rights claims over twenty years. The work identifies relevant court decisions from the 1980s and '90s and diligently investigates them using multiple factors explaining appellate court handling of the civil rights of homosexuals. Integrated models of judicial behavior harmonize the attitudinal and legal approaches. Although the volume is not a traditional doctrinal legal analysis, neither is it a quantitative enterprise wedded to just a few attitudinal variables. The survey performs statistical probes of case votes, but incorporates much more of court opinions than the scholarship of unreconstructed attitudinalists such as Segal and Spaeth. The book addresses the implications of a carefully constructed -and unique -database, viewed through sophisticated statistical lenses, to study nascent legal doctrine.
Chapter 2's narrative overview of judicial decisions elaborates on the subject matter of the collected cases, supplies human drama behind legal battles for lesbian and gay rights in the United States, and introduces analytic concepts that permeate the research.
Chapter 3's quantitative review systematically explains why juridic struggles for homosexual rights either succeeded or failed. It examines the effects of variables from the two judicial behavior models, placed in appropriate institutional, environmental, temporal, and interest group configurations: precedent and case facts, judges' personal attributes, institutional characteristics of courts, jurisdictional environment, a period control, and interest group participation. The statistical findings are applied to specific cases to exemplify how variables had an impact on civil rights claims. The complementary qualitative and quantitative vistas furnish a comprehensive picture of the American judicial system's treatment of lesbian and gay people.
Using its gay rights models, the book next expands the quantitative investigation to far more broadly based legal concerns. Chapter 4 addresses judicial federalism, the sharing of judicial power between the fifty states and the federal government. Legal scholars have argued against trusting allegedly institutionally incompetent state courts with the vindication of individual rights. Yet despite an abundance of theory in the debate over judicial federalism and state court competence, comparatively little purposeful empirical investigation of the topic has been achieved. The volume uses its fully integrated models of judicial decision making to examine the parity dispute in a fresh way. Lesbian and gay rights are a particularly suitable vehicle for studying judicial federalism since they are an issue domain prompting strongly held positions, at both the mass and the elite levels. As noted later, judges are not indifferent to homosexual rights claims and are more disposed to vote their attitudes there than in other, less controversial areas, simply because the topic is so emotionally charged. Accordingly, federalism variables in the integrated models, as well as other methodological techniques, probe whether federal judges acted more dispassionately than state colleagues in adjudicating this minority's rights.
Introducing a highly innovative research design, Chapter 5 rigorously inspects the effect of stare decisis on appellate decision making, far surpassing in scope all current quantitative empirical legal scholarship on the topic. The chapter's noteworthy findings have wide import because the doctrine of precedent is central to traditional jurisprudential explanations of decision making in American courts. Moreover, stare decisis undergirds the Langdellian case method, dominant for more than a century in American legal education.
Concerning both judicial federalism and stare decisis, the book's research design conceives a "crucial case study" (Eckstein 1975: 113-23 ).
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Regarding Chapter 5, for instance, if precedent holds in the arena of lesbian and gay rights, then it must work in other subject matters, given the volatile character of homosexual rights claims in American public policy making.
8 The decisive suppression by stare decisis of judicial preferences in the ideologically cloven terrain of gay rights would indicate it could arrest the effect of attitudes and other nonlegal forces elsewhere as well.
The same applies to Chapter 4's judicial federalism investigation. If federal judges, institutionally insulated by life tenure from public hostility to unpopular decisions, protected the constitutional rights of gay people significantly more than state colleagues, then an inference that federal courts are better equipped than state tribunals to defend minority rights is reasonable.
In sum, the book's comprehensive quantitative examination of appellate response to an emergent minority's legal claims affords an empirically sound explication of that judicial action, as well as a pathway to more general -and telling -commentary on judicial policy making, wholly independent of the lesbian and gay context. The work both explains how diverse factors influenced the adjudication of civil rights claims during a vital era of the homosexual rights movement and formulates promising methodologies for the meaningful quantitative empirical study of law, a substantially neglected field of scholarship.
The Cases
The qualitative and quantitative analyses here rest on an exhaustive collection of the published appellate court decisions in the United States adjudicating lesbian and gay rights claims during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Appendix 1.1 explains how decisions were identified, and Appendix 1.2 lists them. The 468 cases represent a wide array of subjects. Indeed, some observers may not agree that all the decisions truly deal with legal issues that have direct impacts on the rights of homosexuals. In that regard, I have assigned cases to two broad categories: those essential to lesbian and gay rights, and those that are not. Appendix 1.2 identifies the 393 decisions in the former category by posting their names in bold.
Allocating topics between essential and nonessential categories best manifests the distinction between the two. During the 1980s and 1990s, the principal subject categories essential to homosexual rights were (in descending order of frequency): (1) lesbian and gay family matters (including same-sex marriage and its approximation; the custody, visitation, adoption, and foster care (hereafter CVAF) of children by lesbian and gay parents; and the rights of domestic partners); (2) sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, public accommodations, and housing; (3) gays in the military; (4) the constitutionality and enforcement of consensual sodomy and solicitation laws; and (5) the free speech and free association rights of gay people. Nineteen miscellaneous cases include immigration issues, the constitutionality of hate crimes statutes covering sexual orientation, jury selection and other tangential topics in criminal prosecutions, and privacy disputes. Also, since CVAF cases represent more than three-quarters of lesbian and gay family decisions, I treat them as a separate subset.
The two principal topics not essential to lesbian and gay rights are same-sex sexual harassment and defamation involving accusations of homosexuality. Each of these legal issues arguably concerns gay people. If a man is sexually harassed on the job by another man -or a woman by another woman -that conduct may have significant homoerotic content. Likewise, determining whether statements with lesbian or gay subject matter are libelous or slanderous reflects on gay civil rights. Nonetheless, these two causes of action may principally protect heterosexuals. If judges view same-sex sexual harassment as gay men seducing straight men, or lesbians luring heterosexual women, interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or comparable state statutes to include the prohibition of same-sex harassment does not really shield gay men or lesbians. Similarly, if heterosexuals are concerned about false accusations of homosexuality, then per se defamation rules again do not principally safeguard gays. If falsely identifying someone as lesbian or gay is defamation per se, that legal rule fails to handle heterosexuals and homosexuals equally since false accusations of heterosexually are not actionable.
The book excludes AIDS law topics. Moreover, inasmuch as judicial policy making occurs principally at the appellate level (Baum 1998: 8-9) , the research here is not concerned with trial court decisions.
The volume's quantitative analysis relies on the dependent variable outcome. I coded court decisions as 1 if decided in favor of the lesbian or gay claim asserted or defended and as 0 if against. For most cases, the coding process was forthright, in that a homosexual litigant clearly won or lost. However, when there was no such litigant, but a decision nonetheless affected the rights of gay people as a class, the coding rule became whether the court treated homosexuals as the legal equals of heterosexuals. For example, if a court determined that same-sex sexual harassment violated a jurisdiction's (theretofore only heterosexually applied) sexual harassment policy, its action was coded as favorable. In the exceptional instance where all litigants were lesbian or gay (e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y. NY 1994 9 ), I determined whether the court honored the domestic relationships there in order to code the cases as 1. Table 1 .1 reports the mean of outcome by court system 10 and subject matter, revealing substantial differences across both dimensions. For example, state courts decided cases essential to lesbian and gay rights more than twice as favorably, on average, as federal courts (i.e., outcome means of .572 vs. .256, respectively). Among essential nonmiscellaneous cases, First Amendment claims involving free speech and free association rights were decided the most favorably (.583), while cases involving gays in the military were the least successful (.241).
Case Outcome Variation by Court System and Subject Matter
A nonessential subject (same-sex sexual harassment) had the highest mean (.742) of all nonmiscellaneous topics, supporting the theory that judges viewed the issue as a protection of heterosexual men from homosexual harassers. Likewise, the low mean (.308) for defamation cases tends to shield heterosexuals from false accusations of homosexuality.
More on this appears in the next chapter. 11 Surprisingly, courts in the Midwest were the least supportive of lesbian and gay rights, with judges in the socially conservative South even voting more favorably, on average, than in the Midwest. Tribunals in the West and Northeast were the most hospitable. courts that were the least validating of gay rights, followed by Virginia and Ohio. In contrast, Massachusetts courts were the most favorably disposed, with Florida, Minnesota, Colorado, and California close behind. These state-specific findings help explain why the Midwest was the daunting region of the country for gay rights. Missouri's last-place finish tilted the Midwestern average downward, while Florida's strong support boosted the Southern mean. In fact, removing Missouri from the Midwestern data and Florida from the Southern switches those regions' relative positions in family and CVAF decisions, with the South now coming in last.
13 Indeed, further removing Maryland and West Virginia 
